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Aristotelian

Aristotelian In historical psychology and philosophy, Aristotelian refers here to Aristotle’s view that some knowledge is a direct grasp of its object rather than a judgment about it.

In historical psychology and philosophy, Aristotelian refers here to Aristotle’s view that some knowledge is a direct grasp of its object rather than a judgment about it. In this usage, such simple apprehension or intuitive acquaintance is not the kind of act that can be true or false; only judgments are.

Sources

Drafting source: Baldwin Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, 1901. 1901 New York Macmillan original; archive index checked 2026-10-18. “Apprehension” (Apprehension).
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Aristotelian

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Sources

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